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Abstract 
This paper discusses feminist judgments as a specific vehicle for teaching students 
to think critically about law. The analysis of appellate judgments forms a central 
plank of Anglo-Commonwealth and US jurisprudence and legal education. While 
academic scholarship generally offers various forms of commentary on decided 
cases, feminist judgment-writing projects have recently embarked on a new form of 
critical scholarship. Rather than critiquing judgments from a feminist perspective in 
academic essays, the participants in these projects have set out instead to write 
alternative judgments, as if they had been one of the judges sitting on the court at 
the time. After introducing the UK Feminist Judgments Project and describing what 
is ‘different’ about the judgments it has produced, the paper explains some of the 
ways in which these judgments have been used in UK law schools to teach critical 
thinking. The paper finally speculates on the potential production and application of 
feminist judgments or their equivalents beyond the common law context. 
Key words 
Critical thinking; feminist legal theory; Feminist Judgments Project; judicial 
decision-making; legal education; Women’s Court of Canada 
Resumen 
Este artículo analiza las sentencias feministas como un vehículo específico para 
enseñar a los estudiantes a analizar el derecho desde un punto de vista crítico. El 
análisis de las sentencias de apelación constituye un elemento central de la 
jurisprudencia y la enseñanza del derecho en los países angloamericanos y de la 
Commonwealth. Mientras la comunidad académica ofrece generalmente diversas 
formas de comentario de casos resueltos, los proyectos de literatura judicial 
feminista se han embarcado recientemente en un nuevo sistema de crítica 
académica. En lugar de redactar ensayos académicos criticando las sentencias 
judiciales desde una perspectiva feminista, los participantes de estos proyectos se 
han propuesto redactar sentencias alternativas, como si hubieran sido uno de los 
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jueces del tribunal en cuestión. Después de presentar el Proyecto de Sentencias 
Feministas del Reino Unido y describir las “diferencias” que presentan las 
sentencias que ha producido, el artículo explica algunas de las formas en que se 
han utilizado estas sentencias en las facultades de derecho del Reino Unido para 
enseñar pensamiento crítico. Finalmente, el artículo especula sobre la producción y 
aplicación potencial de resoluciones judiciales feministas o sus equivalentes más 
allá del contexto del derecho consuetudinario. 
Palabras clave 
Pensamiento crítico; teoría feminista del derecho; Proyecto de Sentencias 
Feministas; toma de decisiones judicial; enseñanza del derecho; Tribunal de 
Mujeres de Canadá. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper discusses feminist judgments as a specific vehicle for teaching students 
to think critically about law.1 The analysis of appellate judgments forms a central 
plank of Anglo-Commonwealth and US jurisprudence and legal education. The 
traditions of common law development, constitutional and statutory interpretation, 
individual judgments and lengthy reasons for decision provide fruitful sources for 
close study, argument and critique. While academic scholarship generally offers 
various forms of commentary on decided cases (individual or synthetic, analytical 
or critical, descriptive or normative), feminist judgment-writing projects have 
recently embarked on a new form of critical scholarship. Rather than critiquing 
judgments from a feminist perspective in academic essays, the participants in these 
projects have set out instead to write alternative judgments, as if they had been 
one of the judges sitting on the court at the time. This involves putting feminist 
theory into practice in judgment form, under conditions of constraint such as using 
only the law and materials available at the time of the original judgment, 
responding to arguments put by the opposing parties, and observing judicial norms 
of fairness, impartiality, and respect for precedent.2 The aim is to show that, even 
at the time of the original decision, the case could have been reasoned and/or 
decided differently. 
In the following discussion, I first introduce the UK Feminist Judgments Project and 
describe what is ‘different’ about the judgments it has produced, before going on to 
explain some of the ways in which these judgments have been used in law schools 
to teach critical thinking. I finally speculate on the potential production and 
application of feminist judgments outside the common law context. 
Of course feminist judgments need not be imagined. There are many actual 
feminist appellate judgments issued by judges such as Lady Hale on the UK 
Supreme Court, Madame Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé on the Canadian Supreme 
Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in the US Supreme Court and Justice Mary 
Gaudron on the High Court of Australia, to name only a few. Judgments identifiable 
as feminist may also be authored by male judges.3 What the feminist judgment-
writing projects offer, however, is a concentrated collection of feminist judgments 
which announce their own strategies and critical objectives and which aim to be 
accessible, and which may thus be drawn upon readily by legal educators and 
students in teaching and learning. 
2. The UK Feminist Judgments Project 
The idea of writing imagined feminist judgments was first conceived by a group of 
Canadian feminist academics, lawyers and activists who were particularly concerned 
with the development of the Canadian Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on s.15 – the 
equality clause – of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As members of 
the Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF), they had been involved in a 
number of interventions in s.15 cases, in which LEAF had submitted briefs urging 
the Court to implement a more robust conception of substantive equality. Although 
the Court had initially been responsive to their arguments, over time those 
                                                 
1 The paper assumes that students should be taught to think critically about law. Some of the possible 
reasons for doing so are discussed briefly towards the end of the paper. It does not, however, assume 
that legal education is currently not critical, nor that feminist judgments must form part of a critical legal 
education. It simply offers feminist judgments as a new and potentially helpful approach to teaching 
critical thinking in law.  
2 For discussion of the effect of these constraints and the limits they impose on the critical project of 
feminist judgment-writing, see Majury (2006, p. 6); Hunter et al. (2010b, pp. 5-6, 13-15); and Hunter 
(2010). 
3 The question of what counts as a feminist judgment and how feminist judgments may be identified is a 
contentious one which, while falling outside the scope of this paper, has been discussed at length 
elsewhere (see, e.g. Sheehy 2004; Hunter 2008; Baines 2009, 2012). See also the section on ‘What’s 
Different About Feminist Judgments?’ below. 
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arguments appeared to be having less and less impact, and they were searching for 
new ways to capture the Court’s attention. In Majury’s words: 
Women’s equality is painfully far from being a reality—too many women live in 
poverty, unable to feed and house themselves and their children adequately; 
lesbians are merely tolerated, mostly regarded as a deviant lifestyle, sometimes 
targeted for hate and violence; women with disabilities are still denied basic access 
to transportation, employment, and autonomy; racialized women are stigmatized 
and marginalized, and, in the post 9/11 political climate, some are perceived as 
potential terrorists; Aboriginal women are disappearing—raped, murdered, and 
discarded. The issues are urgent; there is much equality work to be done. But, 
politicians and Supreme Court of Canada judges alike seem to think that women 
have largely attained equality and that other issues (balanced budgets and national 
security) should take priority over equality. We are losing equality ground; we are 
in danger of losing our equality footing. (Majury 2006, p. 1) 
It was in this context that they hit upon the idea of rewriting s.15 cases in order to 
demonstrate to the Court how it could be done. They dubbed themselves the 
Women’s Court of Canada (WCC), and set about ‘reviewing’ Supreme Court 
decisions on s.15. The first six decisions of the WCC were published in the Canadian 
Journal of Women and the Law in March 2008 (see http://womenscourt.ca/). One 
of the activities of the WCC from early on was to introduce law students to their 
judgments and encourage students to consider the reasoning they had employed 
and to compare and contrast the judgments of the WCC with the decisions of the 
Supreme Court. The WCC launch event included a one-day symposium 
incorporating student workshops at the University of Toronto, and the WCC 
subsequently went ‘on the road’ to speak to students at the Universities of Victoria 
and Saskatchewan in Western Canada (see http://womenscourt.ca/media). 
Members of the WCC have subsequently published an article on the pedagogical 
use of WCC judgments (Koshan et al. 2010). 
While the WCC focused on a distinct body of jurisprudence, the UK Feminist 
Judgments Project, launched in late 2007, took a broader approach to its subject-
matter, issuing a general invitation to feminist legal academics to write alternative 
feminist judgments in any area of English law. Participants were both self-selected 
and selected their own judgments to rewrite, inevitably choosing cases in which 
they perceived a particular gender issue to arise, and/or an injustice that they 
wished to remedy. The result was the production of 23 alternative judgments 
across a wide range of areas – family law, criminal law, public law, contract, 
property law, banking law, equality and human rights law. In a handful of cases the 
judgment-writer imagined an appeal to a higher court and wrote a fictional appeal 
judgment. However, the majority were written as additional judgments in the 
original case decided by the Court of Appeal, House of Lords or Privy Council. 
Interestingly, not all of these were dissenting judgments. Several were 
concurrences, in which the feminist judgment-writer agreed with the result in the 
case, but did so for different reasons. The judgments have been published in a 
book: Hunter, McGlynn and Rackley (eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to 
Practice (2010a). In the book, each judgment is accompanied by a commentary, 
which explains for the benefit of the non-specialist reader the facts and the issues 
in the original case, how it was originally decided, and what the feminist judgment 
does differently. The book also contains an introduction to the Project and two 
theoretical chapters on the practice of feminist judging and the judgment-writing 
process. 
3. What’s different about feminist judgments? 
The feminist judgments differ from their originals in a variety of ways, both 
substantive and methodological. Substantively, the judgments implicitly draw upon 
various aspects of feminist legal theory, particularly feminist critiques of liberal 
legalism. So, for example, several of the judgments view the subjects of law as 
Rosemary Hunter  Feminist judgments as teaching resources 
 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 2, n. 5 (2012), 47-62 
ISSN: 2079-5971 52 
relational and interdependent rather than as atomised, self-interested and 
competitive individuals (see, e.g., Nedelsky 1989, 1990; Fineman 2004), and seek 
to implement an ‘ethic of care’ rather than the more traditional, masculine 
‘hierarchy of rights’ (see, e.g., Gilligan 1982; Tronto 1993; West 1997; 
Sevenhuijsen 1998; Held 2005). Similarly, some reject the liberal dichotomy which 
sees subjects either as autonomous agents or as vulnerable victims in need of 
protection, and assert the possibility of occupying positions of both autonomy and 
vulnerability, victim and agent, at the same time – a common feature of women’s 
lives (see, e.g. Scales 1986; Hunter 2007; Fineman 2008). Others tackle the 
public/private distinction, and challenge the state’s refusal to limit the power of 
those who control the private sphere from engaging in abuse, exploitation and 
exclusion (see, e.g. Olsen 1984; O’Donovan 1985; Okin 1989; Fineman and 
Mykitiuk 1994; Thornton 1995; Boyd 1997). Others rethink problems of ‘clashing 
rights’ (see, e.g. Kingdom 1992; McColgan 2000) and bring a different perspective 
to bear on these dilemmas which often involves showing how differing rights and 
interests which were assumed to be incompatible can actually be mutually 
accommodated. And some, like the Women’s Court of Canada, advocate a more 
substantive interpretation of ‘equality’, while others continue to appreciate the 
value of formal equality arguments in circumstances where even this basic standard 
of equal treatment is lacking.  
Another group of judgments draw upon Foucauldian critiques of medical or bio-
power (see, e.g. Foucault 1970, 2007; Miller and Rose 1986; Smart 1989; 
O’Donovan 1993; Rose 2006) to question the privileging of ‘expert’ medical or 
welfare opinions, and the associated devaluation of the knowledge and experience 
of parents and carers, or the need for women to produce ‘expert’ medical or 
psychiatric evidence to prove they have been harmed. The judgments also evidence 
the feminist theoretical concern with intersectionality – i.e. the need to 
acknowledge that women do not all share the same essential life experience, but 
that gender intersects with class, race, ethnicity, religion, sexuality and so on in 
different ways (see, e.g. Crenshaw 1989, 1991; Grabham et al. 2008; Lutz, Herrera 
Vivar and Supik 2011). Thus, the judgments deal with the specific positions and 
experiences of older women, lesbians, and Muslim women in particular cultural 
contexts. 
Methodologically, the feminist judgments consistently use a set of techniques which 
are fairly distinctive, and which have also been identified in other literature on 
feminist judging (see, e.g. Resnik 1988; Bartlett 1990; Rush 1993; Sheehy 2004; 
Hunter 2008, 2010; Koshan et al. 2010).4 First is the technique of telling the story 
differently, i.e. recounting the facts of the case in a different way from the original 
judgments in order to give voice to those (often women) who have been silenced or 
sidelined. Second is the use of contextual materials – social science, historical, and 
policy literature – to place the facts and the legal issues in a broader context. For 
example the feminist judgments variously include reference to research evidence 
on rape trials, domestic violence, lesbian motherhood, post-separation parenting, 
ageing, sado-masochistic sexual preferences, and the dynamics of commercial 
relationships. In addition, the judgments incorporate what I have identified as 
‘feminist common knowledge’, i.e. information about the world that feminists 
consider to be so well known that it does not require proof.5 So, for example, the 
feminist judgments draw on common knowledge about caring, marriage, 
parenthood, pregnancy, homophobia, and the intricacies of negotiating ethnic 
minority cultural and religious identities within contemporary British society. The 
                                                 
4 Though it should be stressed that there is no fixed ‘programme’ for feminist judging, and that a 
feminist approach to judging might not differ greatly from any other critically aware judicial approach 
(see Hunter 2010, p. 43). 
5 For a fuller discussion of ‘feminist common knowledge’, and how it relates to the doctrine of judicial 
notice, see Hunter (2010, pp. 38-39; 2012). See also Graycar (1995) on the sources of judicial 
knowledge. 
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use of social science research evidence and feminist common knowledge in turn 
enables the judge to engage in what Katherine Bartlett (1990) calls ‘feminist 
practical reasoning’, i.e. reasoning from context rather than in the abstract, leading 
to more particularised – and arguably therefore more just – results. Such reasoning 
can be used to highlight the shortcomings of the current law, to show why a 
particular rule is inappropriate or inapplicable to the given facts, and/or to 
incorporate previously excluded experiences and perspectives into the stock of legal 
knowledge, which then become available to future judges, lawyers and litigants.  
4. Feminist judgments as teaching resources 
It quickly became obvious to those who participated in the project, and those who 
read the book, that the feminist judgments made excellent teaching resources. 
They did so in three respects. First, they demonstrated how feminist theoretical 
ideas could be implemented in legal practice. For students who were curious as to 
how this could be done, or who were sceptical as to whether it could be done, they 
provided practical illustrations. Some students who expected that judgments 
written from a feminist perspective would be biased or incoherent were forced to 
rethink their preconceptions. For example in the case of Wilkinson v Kitzinger 
(2006), a lesbian couple who had been married in Canada sought to have their 
marriage recognised as a marriage in England, whereas English law recognised it 
only as a civil partnership. They argued that this refusal violated their rights under 
Articles 8, 12 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The 
English judge dismissed their application and advanced a vehement defence of the 
value of ‘traditional’ heterosexual marriage, the protection of which was said to 
justify interference with the applicants’ rights to non-discrimination under Article 14 
ECHR. The feminist judgment (one of the fictional appeals) meticulously examines 
the legal precedents on the ECHR, exposes flaws in the judge’s reasoning on 
Articles 12 and 14, and finds in favour of the applicants (Harding 2010). Students 
comparing the two judgments found that it was the feminist judgment that 
appeared neutral, dispassionate, ‘legal’ and ‘objective’, while the original judgment 
was more emotional, partial and overdetermined.  
In addition, the feminist judgments collectively demonstrate that feminism is not 
monolithic – that there may be a variety of feminist views on a particular issue, and 
that it is not possible simply to ‘read off’ ‘the’ feminist outcome from the facts. 
There is one acknowledged feminist judge on the UK Supreme Court (formerly the 
House of Lords) – Lady Hale. Some of the imagined feminist judgments rewrote her 
decisions, illustrating a different feminist perspective on issues such as the scope of 
the defence of provocation, the relative importance of biological versus social 
motherhood, or whether schoolgirls should be allowed their choice to wear strict 
Islamic dress. 
Secondly, the feminist judgments can be used to provoke critical thinking about 
judicial decision-making by exposing the contingency of the decisions made. 
Results that appeared inevitable are shown not to be so (see also Koshan et al. 
2010, pp. 137, 139). As Majury states in the Canadian context: 
The WCC decision enabled the students to see concretely that the decision really 
could have been written and decided very differently... While the students may 
already have understood this in the abstract, it seemed that reading the rewritten 
judgment helped them to see and understand that potential at a deeper and more 
meaningful level. It became a possibility rather than just an idea. (Koshan et al. 
2010, pp. 136-137) 
The judgments can also be used to highlight the techniques of persuasion judges 
employ, and the choices judges make in constructing the ‘facts’ of the case, hence 
demonstrating that the ‘facts’ represented by the court are indeed selected and 
constructed rather than transparently reflecting an external reality (see also Koshan 
et al. 2010, pp. 130, 138, 142). Following on from this, the judgments provoke 
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reflection on the important relationship between the story told about the facts and 
the outcome of the case.  
Thirdly, the feminist judgments can be used to provoke critical thinking about the 
particular decision made by the court and to illustrate different possibilities for the 
development of legal doctrine in the relevant subject areas. The judgments suggest 
new directions for the development of the common law in relation to property, 
contracts, criminal liability and defences, child welfare and the application of 
international law by domestic courts, among others. They also offer alternative 
interpretations of legislative provisions in human rights law, criminal law, evidence 
law and employment protection law. In some instances, too, they illustrate the 
limits of the law and its inability to provide a remedy. In the case of James v 
Eastleigh Borough Council, the feminist judge reluctantly concludes that an 
interpretation of the concept of discrimination in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
which she might have preferred is simply not open for a judge to make (McColgan 
2010). And the incapacity of judicial review proceedings to regulate potential future 
conflicts, as opposed to adjudicating retrospectively on past events, is clearly 
identified in the feminist judgment in R v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust, ex parte 
Glass (Bridgeman 2010). 
The feminist judgments are now being used for teaching purposes in a number of 
English law schools (and internationally), in ‘gender and law’-type courses (focusing 
on feminist approaches to judging) (see also Koshan et al. 2010, pp. 132-136); in 
introduction to law, jurisprudence and statutory interpretation courses (focusing on 
critical analysis of judicial decision-making); and in doctrinal courses such as family 
law, criminal law, civil liberties, law and commercial relationships, and healthcare 
ethics (focusing on how particular cases might have been decided differently, and 
more generally on alternative possibilities for doctrinal development) (see also 
Koshan et al. 2010, pp. 129-132, 136-137). In some of these courses, students are 
required to draft their own feminist judgment as part of the assessment, or have 
the option of doing so. 
Two of the participants in the project successfully applied to the UK Centre for Legal 
Education for a grant to develop a set of teaching materials based on the Feminist 
Judgments Project.  The grant enabled them to hold two workshops at which 
academics who were using the judgments in teaching, or were interested in doing 
so, could discuss with each other and share ideas about how they were using the 
judgments, how they had designed their classes, and their experiences of teaching 
with the judgments. Subsequently, some of those who attended the workshops 
wrote up their teaching materials, and these are now publicly available on the 
Feminist Judgments website at http://www.feministjudgments.org.uk. The following 
discussion draws upon and presents (in edited form) these teaching materials. 
Two of the sets of materials use the feminist judgments as a vehicle for critical 
analysis of judgment-writing and judicial reasoning. 
4.1. Lois Bibbings, University of Bristol  
− Module: Legal Methods 
− Aims: To enable critical discussion of legal methods, including the 
construction of legal argument, the use of precedent and, in particular, 
techniques of judging.  
− Reading: Court of Appeal judgment in R v Stone and Dobinson (1977); 
feminist judgment in R v Stone and Dobinson (Bibbings 2010);6 theoretical 
material on precedent and judging. 
                                                 
6 R v Stone and Dobinson concerns criminal liability for omissions. The court upheld manslaughter 
convictions for both defendants, on the basis that they had assumed a duty to care for the first 
defendant’s seriously ill sister, and had breached that duty, resulting in her death. The feminist 
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− Questions/Exercise: The focus of the class should be on the discussion 
and analysis of the two versions of the judgment in R v Stone and Dobinson. 
Attention should be directed first to the ‘real’ case: how it is argued, how it 
uses precedent, how convincing its reasoning and decision are and why? An 
analysis of the alternative judgment should follow, along similar lines and 
then a comparative discussion can be introduced. Amongst other things, 
students should be encouraged to think how precedent and the techniques 
of judging are used in each case, which they think is the most 
lawyerly/legalistic and which is the most convincing decision and why. 
Students could also be asked to reflect upon the nature of legal reasoning 
and judging, taking into account different accounts of what is, might or 
should be involved (e.g. objectivity, rationality, logic, craft, creativity, 
emotion, politics, standpoint, empathy). 
4.2. Anna Grear, University of West of England  
− Module: Critical and Legal Reasoning 
− Aims: Understanding how judges reason (reasoning from statutory rules; 
reasoning from cases; the nature and legitimacy of judicial adjudication). 
− Reading: Donoghue v Stevenson (1932); Court of Appeal decision in Porter 
v Commissioner for Police for the Metropolis (1999); feminist judgment in 
Porter v Commissioner for Police for the Metropolis (Grear 2010).7 
− Exercise: Having engaged in an analysis of Donoghue v Stevenson, 
including an interrogation of the various strategies deployed by the judges 
to reach the outcome they preferred, the students were set the task of 
writing an alternative judgment in the case of Porter.  Given the paucity of 
time, the students were set the task of constructing an analytical map of 
their judgment, and also providing one, in-depth, precise paragraph from 
the judgment in relation to any one of their own selected precedents.  The 
students really enjoyed the exercise.  I also gave them the feminist 
judgment as an example of how it is possible to start from any given 
position and still produce a judgment conforming to the canons of legal 
practice.  This, in and of itself, emphasised, in a very practical way, the way 
in which law cannot, even by deploying its own limited and highly specialised 
version of reasoning, close out multiple perspectives. 
Two other sets of materials focus on feminism and the application of feminist theory 
to legal decision-making, while also thinking about techniques of judging. It is 
notable that the second of these (by Fitzpatrick and Hunter) uses an actual rather 
than imagined feminist judgment – an opinion delivered by Lady Hale when she 
was a member of the Court of Appeal, which is contrasted with the judgment of one 
of her male colleagues in the same case. 
4.3. Joanne Conaghan, University of Kent  
− Module: Critical Introduction to Law  
                                                                                                                                               
judgment revisits the facts of the case, acknowledging the difficulties experienced by the defendants 
who themselves suffered from significant disabilities and their unsuccessful attempts to get help for the 
deceased, and attributing blame not to the defendants but to the wider community and the state for 
their failures to care for the family as a whole. 
7 In Porter v Commissioner for Police for the Metropolis, a woman with two young children staged a 
peaceful sit-in at a ultility company’s offices in protest at their alleged failure to connect the electricity 
supply to her new flat. She was forcibly ejected by the police, and unsuccessfully sued them for assault, 
battery, wrongful arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The lawfulness of the police’s 
actions turned on the ability of the utility company to treat her as a trespasser on its premises. The 
Court of Appeal held that it had power to do so. The feminist judgment disagrees, categorising the 
premises not as ‘private’ but as ‘quasi-public’, giving members of the public a right to enter so long as 
their behaviour is not unreasonable.  
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− Aims: understand feminism as a critical ‘mode of analysis or way of seeing’; 
consider the application of that way of seeing to a particular case; analyse 
how the feminist judgment operates, and its similarities and differences from 
the original judgments; critically assess the feminist claim to produce ‘fairer 
trials’. 
− Reading: Privy Council decision in Attorney-General for Jersey v Holley 
(2005); feminist judgment in Attorney-General for Jersey v Holley (Edwards 
2010).8 
− Questions: Privy Council decision: What was the legal issue which Holley 
seeks to resolve? What are the facts? How do you know? Consider the 
majority and minority judgments: (a) What arguments do they put forward? 
(b) What techniques of statutory interpretation do they deploy? (c) Does 
story telling/narrative play a role in any of the judgments? What is the 
relevance of justice to decision-making in Holley? Feminist judgment: In 
what sense is this a ‘feminist’ judgement? Does it work? Does the inclusion 
of gender considerations lead to more just judicial reasoning? Is the author’s 
advocacy of a flexible standard for judging self-control consistent with her 
view that male jealousy and hubris should always be ruled out as a ground 
for provocation? Does it matter? 
4.4. Ben Fitzpatrick and Caroline Hunter, University of York 
− Module: Foundational Issues in Law  
− Aims: Provide a general introduction to feminist legal theories and the 
different feminist approaches to law; Provide a brief introduction to the 
gendered nature of legal decision making through examination of the 
statistics on female judges and the reaction to the appointment of Brenda 
Hale to the House of Lords; Ask students to consider whether there is a 
distinctive female or feminist voice in judging.  
− Reading: The judgments of Brooke LJ and Hale LJ in Parkinson v St James 
and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust (2001)9 (judges’ names 
removed). Suggested further reading includes articles on feminist legal 
theory, women judges, feminist judging, and commentary on the case. 
− Exercise: The students are asked to read the judgments with the following 
questions in mind: Which is by a female and which by a male judge? How 
would you characterise their differences? This is then used to provoke a 
discussion on the nature of the ‘voice’ of the judge. We have now run this 
exercise twice and in general the students could tell the difference. 
Interestingly most preferred what they perceive as the ‘neutral’ voice of 
Brooke LJ’s judgment. 
The final set of materials addresses all three issues: the nature of judgment-
writing, the application of feminist legal theory and different ways in which legal 
doctrine could have developed. The author presents a generic teaching plan for 
introducing feminist judgments in the classroom, which she suggests could be 
                                                 
8 Attorney-General for Jersey v Holley concerned the legal test for the availability of the defence of 
provocation. While a majority of the Privy Council held that the provocation must be such that it could 
cause an ordinary person to lose self control, the feminist judgment prefers the alternative formulation, 
that the provocation could make a person with the defendant’s characteristics (including any physical or 
mental conditions) lose self-control, on the basis that this formulation is necessary in order to do justice 
to battered women who kill their abusers. 
9 The issue in Parkinson v St James and Seacroft University Hospital NHS Trust was whether a mother 
could recover damages for the birth of a disabled child following a negligently-performed sterilisation 
operation. The Court of Appeal unanimously held that damages were recoverable for the extra costs of 
bringing up a child with a significant disability, where that was foreseeably a result of the surgeon’s 
negligence. However, Brooke LJ and Hale LJ gave different reasons for arriving at this conclusion, with 
Hale LJ emphasising in particular the invasion of bodily integrity involved and the effects of pregnancy, 
child birth and caring responsibilities on women. 
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applied to a range of possible modules including Public Law, Legal Method, Law and 
Gender, Human Rights, Legal Theory or a Project-based course. 
4.5. Harriet Samuels, University of Westminster 
− Aims: Understand and experience the process of judgment-writing; Develop 
an understanding of the historical, social, and economic context of 
judgments; Understand and apply feminist method. 
− Reading: First instance, Court of Appeal and House of Lords decisions in 
Roberts v Hopwood (1925); feminist judgment in Roberts v Hopwood 
(Samuels 2010) and accompanying commentary (Palmer 2010);10 Short v 
Poole Corporation (1926), or any two contemporaneous cases that raise 
relevant issues. (Samuels also includes a reading list for the teacher, 
covering women and the law, feminist methods, judicial decision-making, 
judicial politics, women judges, and feminist judging.) 
− Exercise: Introduce the first case; Consider the case in its historical, social, 
economic and political context as appropriate; Study feminist method and 
feminist judgment-writing; Re-write another case using feminist method. 
o Class 1. Discuss thinking critically, feminist method, historical 
context; assign case reading and questions to prepare.  
o Class 2. Discuss the case: facts, arguments, legal issues, majority 
and dissenting judgments, judicial preferences/partiality/values; 
discuss the feminist judgment: how does it apply feminist method? 
Compare and contrast the majority and feminist judgments.  
o Class 3. Prepare students to write a feminist/alternative judgment in 
the second case: summarise facts, summarise arguments, 
conclusions, reasons, reasons for rejecting the other side’s 
arguments; reflection on values, gender issues, wider context. 
o Judgments may be written in next class or in students’ own time. 
It can be seen that these teaching materials mostly seek to engage students in 
discussion, debate and practical exercises, although the feminist judgments can 
clearly also be incorporated into lectures – for example on the Feminist Judgments 
website Conaghan provides powerpoint slides for a lecture on feminist judging and 
the case of Attorney-General for Jersey v Holley (2005) to precede the seminar 
exercise set out above. The materials are also evidently focused on critical thinking 
about law, emphasising various ways in which law may be questioned rather than 
taken for granted, evaluated rather than simply learnt, and considering how a 
critical, feminist approach may be brought to bear, while also being concerned to 
take a critical, questioning approach to the feminist project itself.  As Réaume notes 
in relation to her experience of teaching a seminar dedicated to a sustained analysis 
of the WCC judgments and their originals: 
While the students appreciated the different approach that the WCC brought to the 
cases, they did not passively go along with the new approach. Having opened up 
what made a WCC decision different, the students often noticed gaps or flaws in the 
reasoning of both courts. This sometimes led to reflection on how the gaps could be 
filled, on how the argument really should go. (Koshan et al. 2010, p. 139) 
Although judgments embodying other critical approaches are less readily available, 
the feminist judgments and related teaching materials could also clearly be used to 
                                                 
10 In Roberts v Hopwood, the district auditor disallowed Poplar Borough Council’s decision to pay a 
higher minimum wage to its employees than had been agreed through official trade union negotiations, 
and to pay the same wage to women and men, on the grounds that the proposed pay was excessive, 
unreasonable, amounted to gratuities rather than wages, and failed to take into account the interests of 
the ratepayers. The Council sought judicial review of the auditor’s decision, but the decision was upheld 
by the House of Lords. The feminist judgment draws on contemporary material to demonstrate that 
equal pay for women should not have been considered unreasonable. 
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illustrate ways in which other critical approaches (such as critical legal studies, 
critical race theory or decolonising jurisprudence) could be incorporated into 
judgments, and/or to encourage students to write alternative judgments employing 
these approaches.   
In their article on the use of WCC judgments in teaching, Koshan et al. (2010) 
connect their project firmly with ‘outsider pedagogy’, i.e. the conscious inclusion of 
the experiences and perspectives of ‘outsider’ groups within (legal) education in 
order both to remedy past exclusions and to challenge the claims to neutrality and 
objectivity of traditionally accepted and authoritative ways of seeing and 
understanding the world.  For example, they argue that “Including feminist 
perspectives in legal education...seeks to ensure that women’s voices have 
‘space...credibility, and perhaps even power’” (Koshan et al. 2010, p. 124, quoting 
Bakht et al. 2007, p. 674). They further argue that it is necessary for law students 
to be exposed to multiple social realities and to become aware of “multidimensional 
sources and forms of, as well as solutions to, inequality”, in order to “properly serve 
their clients and be strong social citizens” (Koshan et al. 2010, p. 125; see also pp. 
138, 143-144).  While it has not been the purpose of this paper to advocate specific 
motivations for encouraging law students to engage in critical thinking – or any 
particular kind of critical thinking – I would suggest that there is no necessary 
connection between motivations and methods. While some teachers will use the 
feminist judgments as part of a political project of feminist, critical or ‘outsider’ 
pedagogy, the judgments may also be used by those who are concerned to teach 
students to interrogate the nature of legal reasoning and the development of legal 
doctrine, but may not share these broader political goals. 
5. Further applications? 
Although the feminist judgments have proved to be very useful critical teaching 
resources in a common law context, one question that obviously arises is whether 
this model is applicable in other legal systems. The idea of encouraging students to 
scrutinise court decisions and to write alternative judgments as a way of 
operationalising critical perspectives on law and of thinking critically about legal 
doctrine and judicial decision-making presupposes some degree of indeterminacy 
and judicial choice in the reasoning and outcomes of cases, and some elaboration of 
the reasons for decision. It is not difficult to see such possibilities, for example, in 
relation to the European Court of Human Rights or the International Criminal Court, 
as well as ad hoc post-conflict tribunals (see, e.g. the feminist judgment of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda on the definition of rape in Prosecutor v 
Jean-Paul Akayesu (1998)). In Constitutional Courts, too, there would always seem 
to be room for interpretation. It should be noted that the possibility of delivering 
individual judgments is not a necessary prerequisite. Even where the court speaks 
with one voice, and there is no scope for concurring or dissenting judgments, the 
singular decision of the court may still be open to rewriting.  
It is acknowledged that in some contexts, court decisions may not be the object of 
study because they make no material contribution to the development of the law. 
Here, the emphasis is solely on legislation, possibly incorporating preparatory 
materials as well. Although the idea of alternative judgments would have little 
critical purchase in this situation, it may be possible, by analogy, to think about 
alternative legislative provisions, or alternative processes for producing new 
legislation. The task may indeed be challenging, but critical thinking about law is by 
definition a challenging exercise. Fundamentally, the feminist judgment-writing 
projects have been animated by a perceived gap between law and justice (a gap 
which, according to Derrida (1990), always exists). Wherever such a gap is 
perceived, an alternative has already begun to be imagined. 
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